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Summary

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1 +2ac
2 +Space development key to solve disease
3 +Carson ’15 (Erin Carson, Journalist at CNET, “Exomedicine: How space exploration could improve medicine on Earth”, https://www.techrepublic.com/article/exomedicine-how-space-exploration-could-improve-medicine-on-earth/, October 2, 2015)
4 +A panel at the 2015 IdeaFestival discussed what's next for space exploration, including the burgeoning field of exomedicine. Space—more than just than the final frontier, it could end up being the next frontier in the field of medicine. This was, in part, the theme of the Friday morning panel at the 2015 Idea Festival in Louisville, Kentucky called Next Gen ... SPACE. Panelists included: Julia Aebersold, manager of the Micro/Nano Technology Center (MNTC) clean room at the University of Louisville Jay Gallentine, space historian Michelle Lucas, non-profit Higher Orbits founder and formerly of the Johnson Space Center Twyman Clements, president and CEO of Space Tango Kris Kimel, president and a founder of the Kentucky Science and Technology Corporation who moderated The five-dollar word here is exomedicine. Exomedicine refers to the research and development of medical solutions in the microgravity environment of space for applications on Earth, Kimel said. He said that one major revelation from space travel is that humans know relatively little about living systems and disease processes outside of Earth. But the thing is, microgravity presents a great potential to uncover insights into better ways to treat and prevent disease. What they do know is that in space, things are different. "When you go to space, when you leave the gravity realm, all biological, physical systems are scrambled. When that scrambling occurs, what we're trying to understand is what are the implications of that.... Will that scrambling, in some cases, open up new doors to understanding these diseases that could lead to different kinds of interventions and treatments?" Kimel said. For example, one 2013 experiment in conjunction with Tufts University and Space Tango involved sending planarian flatworms into space for six weeks to test the regenerative abilities of the worms, which on Earth are able to regenerate if cut into pieces. The experiment found that in space, after the worms were cut into tails, heads, and mid sections, they ran into an instance where a mid section grew two heads, and its offspring also had two heads. It's extremely rare and almost never seen on Earth. They want to find out why that happened. Why this could matter is that better understanding regenerative medicine could help on Earth with injuries like those to the spinal cord, or with degenerative diseases like Parkinson's. In space, it could be used to develop new technologies with regenerative properties, like equipment that could keep running while repairing itself. They also teamed with the University of Rome and Moorehead University and have done experiments relating to glioblastoma cells, which are found in malignant brain tumors, and how they restructure themselves in space. It's early in research, but Kimel said they saw changes in the cells that will prompt them to do more research. There are still a few barriers exomedicine has to cross in order to progress. For one, it's still expensive to get experiments into space. Granted, the cost has come down over the years, but finances still present a challenge, Lucas said told TechRepublic. There's also the ironic-sounding factor that there's limited space in space. The International Space Station is about the size of a football field, and that means that there are only so many experiments it can house. That could change with the addition of other space stations, Lucas said, that could accommodate scenarios like drug-maker Merck sending up a handful of scientists for a few months to work. Another issue is safety, Gallentine said. He referenced a welding experiment by the Soviets as one point that was significantly complicated by the fact that it was being undertaken in space. And beyond the development of new treatments or approaches to treating and preventing sickness, the burgeoning of exomedicine could also have implications for a newer generation of scientists, researchers, and doctors who may consider not just studying medicine, but studying space medicine. Lucas said that there's always been some thought that perhaps a significant medical breakthrough could come from space, but access to space has been limiting and that has hampered innovation. "One of the keys to innovation is you have to be able to fail fast and cheap," Kimel said. Gallentine also said it's taken a long time for people to get more comfortable working with microgravity. "It's been a recent convention that now that we've figured out how people can exist in this environment and figured out what it does to people, and what we need to do to counteract that, now we can move forward with the advantages of this environment," he said. The panel also covered a variety of space-related topics including the recent discovery of evidence there may be water on Mars, the implications of finding organic or microbial life on the planet, and even the future of STEM jobs in space. "I think that everybody needs to consider the idea that a revolution could be coming from a medicine perspective," Lucas said.
5 +Pandemic diseases cause extinction
6 +Millett ’17 (Piers Millett, Consultant for the World Health Organization, PhD in International Relations and Affairs, University of Bradford, Andrew Snyder-Beattie, “Existential Risk and Cost-Effective Biosecurity”, Health Security, Vol 15(4), http://online.liebertpub.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1089/hs.2017.0028)
7 +Historically, disease events have been responsible for the greatest death tolls on humanity. The 1918 flu was responsible for more than 50 million deaths,1 while smallpox killed perhaps 10 times that many in the 20th century alone.2 The Black Death was responsible for killing over 25% of the European population,3 while other pandemics, such as the plague of Justinian, are thought to have killed 25 million in the 6th century—constituting over 10% of the world’s population at the time.4 It is an open question whether a future pandemic could result in outright human extinction or the irreversible collapse of civilization. A skeptic would have many good reasons to think that existential risk from disease is unlikely. Such a disease would need to spread worldwide to remote populations, overcome rare genetic resistances, and evade detection, cures, and countermeasures. Even evolution itself may work in humanity’s favor: Virulence and transmission is often a trade-off, and so evolutionary pressures could push against maximally lethal wild-type pathogens.5,6 While these arguments point to a very small risk of human extinction, they do not rule the possibility out entirely. Although rare, there are recorded instances of species going extinct due to disease—primarily in amphibians, but also in 1 mammalian species of rat on Christmas Island.7,8 There are also historical examples of large human populations being almost entirely wiped out by disease, especially when multiple diseases were simultaneously introduced into a population without immunity. The most striking examples of total population collapse include native American tribes exposed to European diseases, such as the Massachusett (86% loss of population), Quiripi-Unquachog (95% loss of population), and theWestern Abenaki (which suffered a staggering 98% loss of population). In the modern context, no single disease currently exists that combines the worst-case levels of transmissibility, lethality, resistance to countermeasures, and global reach. But many diseases are proof of principle that each worst-case attribute can be realized independently. For example, some diseases exhibit nearly a 100% case fatality ratio in the absence of treatment, such as rabies or septicemic plague. Other diseases have a track record of spreading to virtually every human community worldwide, such as the 1918 flu,10 and seroprevalence studies indicate that other pathogens, such as chickenpox and HSV-1, can successfully reach over 95% of a population.11,12 Under optimal virulence theory, natural evolution would be an unlikely source for pathogens with the highest possible levels of transmissibility, virulence, and global reach. But advances in biotechnology might allow the creation of diseases that combine such traits. Recent controversy has already emerged over a number of scientific experiments that resulted in viruses with enhanced transmissibility, lethality, and/or the ability to overcome therapeutics.13-17 Other experiments demonstrated that mousepox could be modified to have a 100% case fatality rate and render a vaccine ineffective.18 In addition to transmissibility and lethality, studies have shown that other disease traits, such as incubation time, environmental survival, and available vectors, could be modified as well.19-2
8 +
9 +T
10 +The office of space commerce
11 +https://www.space.commerce.gov/policy/national-space-policy/
12 +On June 28, 2010, President Obama issued a National Space Policy directive providing comprehensive guidance for all government activities in space, including the commercial, civil, and national security space sectors. The new policy leans farther forward in support of U.S. business interests than any previous space policy.
13 +
14 +China-Russia relations
15 +
16 +And – the bill is uniquely contentious
17 +Erwin 9/12 (Sandra Erwin, SpaceNews Staff Writer, editor of NDIA’s National Defense Magazine, Pentagon correspondent for Real Clear Defense. “Senate appropriators add $22M for small launch, approve Space Force and Space Development Agency requests”, https://spacenews.com/senate-appropriators-add-22m-for-small-launch-approve-72m-space-force-request/, September 12, 2019) MMW
18 +WASHINGTON — The Senate Appropriations Committee on Thursday advanced the defense subcommittee’s spending proposal for fiscal year 2020 that provides $622.5 billion in base defense funding, $70.7 billion for Overseas Contingency Operations and $1.7 billion in emergency funding. According to a draft of the full committee markup, the SAC added $22 million for a new program called Tactically Responsive Space Launch and approved the $72.4 million requested by the Pentagon to stand up a Space Force. The SAC defense subcommittee on Tuesday revealed that it supported funding the Space Force and that it had created the new launch program line but the amount of the funding was not known until today. The bill is headed for a contentious fight on the Senate floor as Democrats attempt to block Trump administration efforts to take funds from military projects to pay for the U.S.-Mexico border wall. The $22 million for Tactically Responsive Space Launch was added to the Air Force’s Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) account. “The committee believes that demonstrating tactically responsive launch operations that leverage new and innovative commercial capabilities will enable Department of Defense space domain mission assurance and strategic deterrence objectives,” said the committee’s draft report accompanying the markup. Appropriators noted that a “coherent tactically responsive launch concept of operations is needed to address tactics, techniques, and procedures and support operationally relevant satellite reconstitution demonstrations and pilot programs.” The committee said establishing a dedicated funding line will give Congress more visibility and oversight of small launch funding. The SAC also included a provision in the bill for “inland launch.” The committee directs the Pentagon to report back on the “feasibility, potential benefits and risks, and cost estimates of the establishment of an inland testing and space corridor for hypersonic testing and space launch.” Appropriators want DoD to consider using existing military test ranges and spaceports and identify regulatory, statutory, or other impediments to using such facilities for launch or hypersonic testing. The SAC provisions on small launch and use of inland facilities are consistent with the language in the Senate version of the National Defense Authorization Act that that calls for the integration of commercial capabilities into DoD space operations.
19 +The bill requires MASSIVE spending increases in space defense and is contentious
20 +Maucione 9/10 (Scott Maucione, defense reporter for Federal News Network and reports on human capital, workforce and the Defense Department at-large, “Senate ups R&D spending in defense appropriations bill, battle still brewing on wall funding”, https://federalnewsnetwork.com/defense-main/2019/09/senate-ups-rd-spending-in-defense-appropriations-bill-battle-still-brewing-on-wall-funding/, September 10, 2019) MMW
21 +Battle brewing While the Senate appropriations bill is largely in line with the House version of the bill, one sticking point could causing a delay in funds for DoD or even a possible shutdown. The Trump administration wants to use $3.6 billion in military construction funds that were appropriated in previous years for 2020 to build a wall on the southern border. The funds that will be taken from the 2020 budget and include an ambulatory care center, cyber operations facility, ship maintenance facilities, schools for service members’ children and more. Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee Ranking Member Dick Durbin (D-Ill.) lamented the fact that the bill did not prohibit the transfer of those funds. “The basis of these cancellations is based on a national emergency declared by the president that was rejected on its face by both houses on Congress in bipartisan votes,” Durbin said during the Tuesday subcommittee markup of the bill. “Congress cannot and should not be silent when the power of the purse is undermined in this way. Why are we here? Why do we have an Appropriations Committee if this president can ask for money for certain purposes we appropriated and then he ignores us? He then takes the money for his own political agenda.” House Armed Services Readiness Subcommittee Chairman John Garamendi said Tuesday that he will not support reimbursing DoD for the 127 projects the president is taking from to build the wall. “The new congressional budget agreement prevents us from doing so without raiding funds from other accounts. I made myself clear: Congress will not backfill these accounts,” Garamendi said. “We will not allow the president to defy the constitution by circumventing Congress’ power of the purse. This fight is about the very nature of our democracy, and we will not lose.”
22 +And nasa thumps Specifically with Russia
23 +EIR ’19 (Executive Intelligence Review, “Russia and U.S. Still Enjoy Cooperation in Space Science, as Soyuz Launches Crew to ISS”, https://larouchepub.com/pr/2019/190314_space_cooperation.html, March 14, 2019)
24 +Despite the many disputes, cooperation between the United States and Russia in space continues. Roscosmos Director General Dmitry Rogozin and NASA’s Associate Administrator of the Human Exploration and Operations, William Gerstenmaier, discussed space cooperation between the two countries, Roscosmos press service told TASS today. “The conversation took place yesterday. They talked about the future of the International Space Station and further cooperation plans, pointing out that the NASA and Roscosmos groups continue to work and discuss cooperation and current pressing issues,” Roscosmos said. Roscosmos and NASA “hear and understand” each other as far as the future of the ISS goes, but no final decision has been made yet whether to extend the station’s operation as “everything is under consideration.” This evening, Rogozin and Gerstenmaier together watched the successful launch of the Soyuz-FG carrier rocket from Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan, which will deliver Russia’s Alexei Ovchinin and NASA’s Nick Hague and Christina Koch to the ISS tomorrow. Furthermore, Russian and U.S. scientists are in talks on the creation of a lunar navigation system similar to GLONASS and GPS, Vice President of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) Yury Balega told TASS. “In the framework of studying the Earth’s natural satellite, U.S. colleagues suggested developing a joint navigation system around the Moon, similar to GPS or GLONASS, so that all participants in Moon exploration projects can use it,” Balega said during a visit to NASA headquarters. The RAS delegation, led by its President Alexander Sergeyev, is currently in the United States on a working visit, where they visited NASA and also signed an agreement with the U.S. National Academy of Sciences on cooperation in the sphere of scientific, engineering, and medical research. Balega reported that the delegation discussed programs for exploring the Moon and Venus with NASA. “Our American partners said that they consider the Venus program to be predominantly Russian-led and think that Russia’s contribution to it should thus stand at 70-80%. We talked about different options of exploring Venus’s atmosphere, including launching a flying apparatus—a drone—into the high layers of Venus’s atmosphere, in order to study its chemical composition,” Balega said. He further said that “it is very important that we agreed to hold two brainstorming sessions on both Venus and the Moon in Moscow. The session on the Moon will take place in the Spring of 2020, and the one on Venus—in the Fall of this year.”
25 +
26 +Multiple space actions thump any generic links
27 +Bowe ’19 (Alexander Bowe, Policy Analyst, Security and Foreign Affairs, US-China Economic And Security Review Commission, “China’s Pursuit of Space Power Status and Implications for the United States”, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/USCC_China%27s%20Space%20Power%20Goals.pdf, April 11, 2019)
28 +Recent developments suggest the United States is committed to both significant new civil space exploration programs and a new Space Force in the Department of Defense; Heather Wilson, Secretary of the U.S. Air Force, said in March 2019 the United States “will continue to be the best in the world at space, and establishing a dedicated space force strengthens our ability to deter, compete, and win in space.” 141 In February 2018, the Trump Administration released its Presidential Memorandum on Reinvigorating America’s Human Space Exploration Program, calling for the United States to “lead the return of humans to the Moon for long-term exploration and utilization, followed by human missions to Mars and other destinations.”142 In March 2019, invoking a “space race” with China and Russia, Vice President Mike Pence, who leads the National Space Council, announced the Administration is committed to returning U.S. astronauts to the moon for the first time since 1972 by 2024 “by any means necessary.” 143 Major new projects such as the Space Launch System (SLS) rocket, the Orion capsule, and the Lunar Gateway—a small crewed space station planned for lunar orbit that will be able to support a maximum of four crew members for 30–90 day tours144—are funding priorities for the Administration, although NASA is open to commercial alternatives if the SLS is not ready in time. 145 According to NASA, the Gateway is “central to advancing and sustaining human space exploration goals” and will provide crewed missions a common jumpingoff point to space on the near side of the moon, for robotic and human lunar surface access, and for missions to Mars; it is designed to “offer astronauts longer stays on the lunar surface, easier crew returns, safe haven in the event of an emergency, and the ability to navigate to different orbits around the Moon.”146 Canada has announced a 24-year commitment to cooperate on the Gateway, and potential additional partners include Japan, Russia, and the European Space Agency. 147 If the Gateway is delayed and the ISS is not extended beyond 2024, however, retiring the ISS before alternatives for low-gravity research are deployed could result in a gap in U.S. space access, potentially grounding U.S. astronauts until NASA develops new space flight vehicles. 148
29 +No impact to short term relations breakdown – strategic interest necessitates cooperation, but long-term alliance breakdown is inevitable
30 +Jethwa’19 (Pravin R. Jethwa, consultant on defense and international security in London, “Expect a War Between Russia and China in the 2020s”, Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies; Bar-ilan university, https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/expect-war-russia-china/#, July 18, 2019) MMW
31 +During his state visit to Russia earlier this month, President Xi Jinping of China effusively hailed President Vladimir Putin of Russia as his “best friend and colleague.” Putin, not to be outdone, replied by affirming his personal respect for Xi, and suggested that Sino-Russian relations have progressed not only to an “unprecedentedly high level” in recent years, but are now increasingly based on a “truly comprehensive partnership and strategic interaction.” But whatever Putin means by “strategic interaction,” and despite the undeniable progress in Sino-Russian relations over the past decade, it is easy to fall into the trap of exaggerating what some fear is an emerging Sino-Russian “axis” in world politics. Notwithstanding the Xi-Putin friendship and the growing congruence of both countries’ interests in undermining the US-led international order, relations between Russia and China remain at their core as brittle and prone to mutual suspicion and distrust as they have in the past. It is, after all, only 50 years since the two Eurasian giants nearly stumbled into a cataclysmic war following a series of unprovoked Chinese attacks on Soviet troops garrisoned along the then-contested river boundaries in Russia’s Far East. Although Moscow stayed its hand from an all-out military assault on China, the border clashes of 1969 continue to rankle historical memories and military thinking in Russia to this day. Such territorial jostling along the vast expanses of Eurasia has, in fact, defined Russo-Chinese relations historically, and will continue to do so in the future. And therein lies the existential rub, especially for Russia. From the perspective of a strategic planner in Moscow, China – which contains a billion-and-a-half people – not only dwarfs Mother Russia in population, national power, and economic might. It has also – much more worryingly – become a near military equal, prone to intimidation and throwing its weight around its periphery at will. Witness, for example, Beijing’s swift and brazen conquest of the South China Sea, the unrelenting probing into Vietnamese, Philippine, and Japanese maritime spaces, and to its west, the frequent incursions, stand-offs, and aggressive territorial claims against India. None of these acts of Chinese belligerence will have escaped the notice of Russian planners who, despite the paradox of Moscow’s shared strategic interests with Beijing to counter America’s power and influence in world affairs, are nonetheless bound to view China’s rapid and inexorable rise to the front rank of global powers with acute concern. But despite any apprehensions Moscow may quietly harbor, Russo-Chinese relations in the short term – over the next four or five years – are likely to remain largely in harmony. This is mainly because Putin’s carefully tended relationship with Xi enables him, among other things, to maintain the pretense of Russia as a great power, attract Chinese investment, and, more generally, project an image of himself as a world-class statesman. And Xi, though leading an immeasurably more powerful country than Russia except in terms of offensive nuclear firepower, tactfully grants Putin the appearance and status of an equal through elaborately choreographed summit meetings, the bestowing of high level state and friendship awards, and personal respect, in order to secure at least tacit deference by Moscow to the Sino-centric Eurasian geopolitical order currently being planned in Beijing. Yet beyond the apparent bonhomie and geopolitical dalliance between Xi and Putin, the historic and atavistic tensions deeply rooted between the Slavic and Han civilizations represented by Russia and China are bound to emerge again, probably in violent form, in the next decade. In fact, signs already abound of Russian nervousness as China relentlessly pushes its Silk Road initiatives, coercive economic practices, and diplomatic blandishments deep into the entire former Soviet space in Central Asia. Although the Chinese have so far refrained from asserting strategic-security rights in the geopolitical arc along Russia’s southern periphery, it is only a matter of time before some hyper-nationalist general in Beijing does so. The Russians can be relied upon to react with unrestrained fury. But what will likely drive Russia to a defensive war with China before the next decade is out is the growing probability of Chinese territorial encroachment into Russia’s sparsely populated far eastern region bordering the Pacific. The Russian territories north of the Amur and east of the Ussuri Rivers in eastern-Central Asia, which currently demarcate the agreed boundaries between the two countries, are historically and insistently claimed by China. Chinese military maps even show these areas as Chinese territories. These territorial claims, combined with the sheer population disparities – over 130 million people live in three Chinese provinces bordering Russia’s Far East, where the population is estimated at less than 8 million – and the need to secure long-term access to living space and natural resources almost preordains that Beijing will sooner or later demand revisions to what it calls “unequal” border treaties with Czarist Russia dating back to the mid-19th century. And although the Russians are equally bound to resist, it is not inconceivable that China at some point will demand access or land-lease rights to parts of Russia’s Far East, or, failing that, that the Chinese army will simply march across the border into Vladivostok, Russia’s only warm water access to the Pacific, to stamp China’s historic claim and rights to the region. It is not clear at this juncture how Russia and China can step back from a conflict in the coming decade. But as China appears unlikely to relinquish its expansive territorial claims against its neighbors, including Russia, the onus for deterring China from seizing Russian territories will fall upon Putin or his successors in the 2020s. The question of whether China really can be deterred as its geostrategic ambitions grow across Eurasia remains to be seen. If the current Xi-Putin bromance fails to tamp down Chinese expansionism, expect a war between the two nuclear armed states in the 2020s.
32 +
33 +
34 +2AC—China-US CP
35 +
36 +Permutation solves best
37 +Larsen’18 (Paul B. Larsen, taught air and space law for more than 40 years respectively at Southern Methodist University and at Georgetown University. He is coauthor of PB Larsen, JC Sweeney and JE Gillick, Aviation Law, Cases, Laws and Related Sources (second edition Martinus Nijhof, 2012) and of F Lyall and PB Larsen, Space Law A Treatise (Ashgate 2009). “Outer Space Arms Control: Can the USA, Russia and China Make this Happen”, Journal of Conflict & Security Law, Vol. 23 No. 1, 137–159, 2018) MMW
38 +An effective arms control regime for outer space by necessity would have to include all the three states that possess significant military arms technology that can be deployed in outer space. It would therefore be most effective if the three States having military space technology were to get together to agree on arms control. A separate understanding among the United States, Russia and China could become the nucleus of new arms control regime in outer space. But that would necessitate these states meeting outside existing UN fora. That is entirely possible if the parties so agree.
39 +
40 +No solvency - Russia is key- only cooperation now with Russia prevents nuclear war
41 +Rumer and Sokolsky ’19 (Eugene Rumer, Rumer is the director of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Prior to joining Carnegie in 2014, he worked at several research organizations and served on the National Security Council Staff, at the State Department, and in the intelligence community, and Richard Sokolsky, Sokolsky is a nonresident senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He worked in the Department of State for six different administrations and was a member of the secretary’s Policy Planning Staff from 2005-2015. He has also been a senior fellow at Rand and the National Defense University. He writes frequently on U.S. foreign policy, “How to Reset U.S.-Russian Relations Today”, https://time.com/5610524/u-s-russian-relations/, June 20, 2019)
42 +US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin arrive for a meeting in Helsinki, on July 16, 2018. Trump announced on Twitter that he and Putin had a "Very productive talk!" about things including the Mueller report. Brendan Smialowski—AFP/Getty Images For thirty years, since the end of the Cold War, U.S. policy toward Russia has been going in circles with the relationship getting worse as different U.S. administrations came and went. Today, the U.S.-Russian relationship is at the lowest point since before the Cold War ended and the best we can hope for is that it will not get even worse. Russia is to blame for most of what went wrong in this relationship. It invaded Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014, it interfered in the 2016 United States presidential election, and it continues to meddle in Venezuela, in Syria, in Libya, etc. But it takes two to tango. Rarely, have U.S. policymakers questioned U.S. policy toward Russia. Have we done everything right? A look back at the record of the Bill Clinton, Barack Obama, and George W. Bush presidencies’ dealings with Russia produces surprising results. These three very different administrations embraced the same set of policies toward Russia. They were built around two pillars: a refusal to accept Russia for what it was and insistence that it reform itself to better fit the image of what U.S. policymakers thought Russia should look like; and the view that NATO was the only legitimate European security organization, while expanding it ever deeper into the former Soviet lands. Russia rejected both of these, but U.S. policymakers proceeded with these policies anyway on the assumption that sooner or later Russia would recognize what was good for it. In the community of Russia hands it became known as the “spinach treatment”—kids don’t like spinach, but should eat it because it’s good for them. Every U.S. administration has gone through the boom-bust cycle in its dealings with Russia. The Clinton administration took charge of the relationship in 1993 and promised to build a partnership with Russian democracy, Russian reforms, Russian markets. The two presidents—Clinton and Russia’s Boris Yeltsin—built a strong personal bond. Yet the road to partnership became more and more difficult as disagreements arose over Russia’s slow reform progress, NATO expansion, the Kosovo campaign, and much else. By the end of the 1990s both sides grew frustrated with each other. The Clinton chapter of that relationship ended amid fears that Yeltsin’s successor, Vladimir Putin, was backsliding on democracy. The Brief Newsletter Sign up to receive the top stories you need to know right now. View Sample SIGN UP NOW Despite these misgivings, the George W. Bush administration attempted to build its own partnership with Russia. In 2001, Bush and Putin pledged to build a new relationship based on a “joint commitment to democracy, free market, and the rule of law.” That relationship followed the familiar pattern as disagreements arose—over the Iraq war, Russian backsliding on democracy, and NATO expansion. In 2008, following NATO’s pledge of future membership to former Soviet republics Georgia and Ukraine, Russia crushed the tiny Georgian military as the United States and its NATO allies watched, but did not interfere. Russia effectively declared the former Soviet states off limits to NATO. The relationship with Russia was once again at the lowest point since the Cold War. The Obama administration attempted to “reset” the relationship with Russia and launched its own partnership. The idea there was to modernize its economy and liberalize its politics. That too proved short-lived, as hopes for both political liberalization and economic modernization proved unrealistic. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea in 2014 plunged U.S.-Russian relations to yet a new low, only to be followed by Russian meddling in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. The Trump administration attempted its own “reset” with Russia but did not get far as Russia-related scandals and investigations proliferated. Sanctions have become not just a tool of U.S. policy toward Russia, but the replacement for it. The relationship is at an impasse, while a reasoned policy discussion about Russia is not possible because the issue has become toxic in U.S. domestic politics. This situation is not sustainable. The time has come to recognize that Russia is not going to change its domestic arrangements to suit U.S. preferences, and conditioning U.S. policy on such a change is pointless. Similarly, Russia is not going to change its view of NATO and accept further enlargement to include Ukraine and Georgia—both countries with which it shares a long and complicated history, and in which it has much greater interests than the United States. The United States and its allies are not prepared to go to war for Ukraine or Georgia. Russia is and has. That is a clear indicator that the goal of their membership in the alliance is unrealistic and should be dropped. After multiple failed attempts to build a partnership with Russia the time has come to give up that idea. Instead, U.S. policy should focus on issues of critical importance to the United States. Nuclear weapons, arms control, and strategic stability are one such set of issues. The existing U.S.-Russian arms control framework is unraveling. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty is practically dead following Russian violations of it and U.S. decision to abandon it in response. The New START Treaty due to expire in early 2021 can be extended and thus saved, but the Trump administration seems more inclined to pursue frivolously a trilateral U.S.-Russia-China treaty instead, which neither Russia nor China seems interested in discussing. The existing arms control framework may not look like much to its critics, but it is vastly better than nothing—at a time when new technologies are threatening to undermine the delicate balance of terror between the two nuclear superpowers. It is tempting after aiming high and ending up low so many times to give up on the relationship with Russia. That is not an acceptable outcome. Having tried and failed to transform Russia, U.S. policy is now without a purpose. Unlike a Seinfeld episode, it cannot be a “show about nothing.” The way forward then is to set forth realistic and attainable—rather than transformational—objectives, to accept that our differences may not be solvable, but will have to be managed, and on many issues we’ll just have to agree to disagree. To quote the great philosopher and theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, sometimes it is best to find “proximate solutions to insoluble problems.”
43 +
44 +Perm do CP
45 +
46 +CP doesn’t solve any of three advantages- all require US-Russian cooperation on space stalkers- Trevithick says that space is a critical relations buffer – only the plan prevents conflict escalation with Russia
47 +
48 +AND-
49 +International FIAT is a voting issue- steals aff ground and infinite number of actors preclude research- reject the team
50 +
51 +
52 +And- new diplomatic measures now key to prevent crash in relations
53 +Burns ’19 (William J. Burns, William J. Burns is president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He previously served as U.S. deputy secretary of state, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “How the U.S.-Russian Relationship Went Bad”, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/03/08/how-u.s.-russian-relationship-went-bad-pub-78543, March 8, 2019)
54 +Today, of course, the American relationship with Moscow is more bizarre, and more troubled, than at any point since the end of the Cold War. In Helsinki last summer, President Donald Trump stood alongside Putin, absolved him of election interference, and publicly doubted the conclusions of America’s intelligence and law-enforcement services. Trump’s narcissism, breathtaking disregard for history, and unilateral diplomatic disarmament are a depressing trifecta at a moment when Russia poses threats that were unimaginable a quarter century ago. He seems oblivious to the reality that “getting along” with rivals like Putin is not the aim of diplomacy, which is all about advancing tangible interests. Managing relations with Russia will be a long game, conducted within a relatively narrow band of possibilities. Navigating such a great-power rivalry requires tactful diplomacy—maneuvering in the gray area between peace and war; demonstrating a grasp of the limits of the possible; building leverage; exploring common ground where we can find it; and pushing back firmly and persistently where we can’t. The path ahead with Russia will get rockier before it gets easier. We ought to traverse it without illusions, mindful of Russia’s interests and sensibilities, unapologetic about our values, and confident in our own enduring strengths. We should not give in to Putin—or give up on the Russia beyond him.
55 +
56 +
57 +US Unilateral CP
58 +2AC
59 +
60 +CP is the status quo – perm do the CP
61 +
62 +Permutation do both
63 +
64 +There’s a clear DB- either they involve Russia to solve the rels flow by increasing coop with russia which links to all of their net benefits or they don’t include Russia and can’t solve the Rels flow
65 +Turn- doubling down especially triggers the affs impacts- space dominance is impossible
66 +Scharre’18 (Paul Scharre, author of Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War, a senior fellow and Director of the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, and a former Army Ranger with multiple tours to Iraq and Afghanistan. “The US Military Should Not Be Doubling Down on Space”, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/08/us-military-should-not-be-doubling-down-space/150194/, August 1, 2018) MMW
67 +Yes, a #SpaceForce is a dumb idea, but not because @realDonaldTrump said it. The U.S. military has real problems in space and a Space Force is likely to make them worse, not better. Space is “congested, contested, and competitive” — as many have pointed out — and the U.S. advantages in space are waning. But responding by creating a Space Force is building a castle on a foundation of sand. Space is an inherently vulnerable and offense-dominant domain. Satellites move through predictable orbits. There simply aren’t many good options for space hardening/defenses. Defenders can add fuel to a satellite to make it mobile and move and change orbits, but more fuel adds weight and there is no easy way to refuel the satellite once in orbit. The same applies for defenses or armor. Defenders pay for all of that weight in launch costs. Defenders can make satellites stealthy-ish, but if even amateur observers can find secret military satellites, surely nation-state adversaries can. And even if satellites remain hidden, they’re still vulnerable to debris in low earth orbit, a growing problem that isn’t getting better. The reality is that satellites are vulnerable to attack — through both kinetic and non-kinetic means from lasers, electronic warfare, and cyber — and there is no good way to fix this. America has built a military that is heavily dependent on a global C4ISR command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance architecture that runs through space — the eyes and nervous system of the Joint Force. The United States was able to do this because for a long time no one contested the U.S. in space, but that era is over. Space is no longer a unique advantage; it is now a unique vulnerability. Space is the American military’s Achilles heel. The United States need to mitigate that vulnerability, not double down on it. Instead of focusing on the domain — space — the Pentagon should be focused on the mission: global C4ISR. The U.S. need a global C4ISR and precision-navigation-timing, or PNT, backbone that is more resilient and survivable in the case of adversary attacks. Some of that solution is in space — hosted payloads on commercial platforms, cheaper small sats, quick-launch satellites for operationally responsive space, and maybe even new concepts like fractionated satellites.
68 +The perception of any unilateralism CP just triggers a global arms race, hurts alliances, and causes other countries to double down on defecting from peaceful norms
69 +Finkelstein and Nevitt ’18 (Claire Finkelstein, Senior Fellow of FPRI, is the Algernon Biddle Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pennsylvania Law School and Director of Penn Law’s Center for Ethics and the Rule of Law (CERL), and Mark Nevitt 9Mark P. Nevitt is the Sharswood Fellow at the University of Pennsylvania Law School and a member of Truman National Security Project’s Defense Council. He previously served a 20-year career as both a naval flight officer and member of the Navy Judge Advocate General’s Corps with the rank of commander), “Trump risks leading the world into a space arms race”, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/402640-trump-risks-leading-the-world-into-a-space-arms-race, August 21, 2018)
70 +Vice President Mike Pence’s call last Thursday for the creation of a U.S. Space Force to achieve “American dominance in space” reflects a risky agenda on the part of the Trump administration, one that could propel the world into a global arms race in outer space. Echoing a speech that President Trump gave in June, Pence declared space a “warfighting domain” and asserted the need for American superiority in that arena. The Pentagon has opposed creating a space force, and it is of questionable military benefit. Defense Secretary James Mattis registered his opposition to the idea last year, stating that the measure would impair the Department of Defense’s ability to integrate its joint warfighting functions. Congress also has not been enthusiastic, preferring the lesser measure of a “space command” within the military’s operational command structure. What, then, is the administration’s reason for this proposal? A motive might be sought in the potentially profitable commercial ventures in outer space, such as asteroid mining, for which the president has voiced support. The president may imagine that a Space Force is the way to gain control over and protect the valuable assets involved. However, this way of thinking is risky. Currently, outer space is “militarized” but not yet “weaponized.” Militaries around the globe make heavy use of satellite technology — such as surveillance and global positioning — but so far they have refrained from placing weapons on satellites in outer space or using them directly for warfighting. The administration’s ad hoc push for space dominance risks upsetting a delicate balance: space now hovers precariously at the brink of weaponization and it would take only one major country defecting from the current system of peaceful self-constraint to drive us into a major arms race in outer space. The current peaceful equipoise is largely because of the remarkable success of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, an international agreement with which more than 100 signatory countries have been compliant. Under this treaty, space is considered a “province of mankind” that is not owned or controlled by any single nation. Article IV of the treaty provides that celestial bodies be used “for peaceful purposes only,” and objects in orbit carrying nuclear or weapons of mass destruction are strictly prohibited. Article II of the treaty makes clear that outer space “is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty.” Seeking military dominance in space, coupled with encouraging appropriation of space for commercial purposes, puts us at loggerheads with our traditional allies, upsets stable and well-established treaty obligations, and moves the world closer to a highly dangerous arms race in outer space. It is important to distinguish the idea of a Space Force from the pursuit of military and economic superiority in space. There may not be anything intrinsically wrong with the idea of a Space Force, or in somewhat more moderate form, a “Space Corps,” similar to the Marine Corps, or a “Space Command,” as Congress has called for in the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act, which President Trump signed into law last Monday. The merits of a stand-alone space unit depend on how its mission is conceived and how it fits into broader U.S. policy objectives in outer space, but a thoughtful, coherent and measured inter-agency space policy has yet to emerge. The danger comes from the aim of dominance, not the particular way in which dominance is sought. In addition to potentially touching off an arms race of planetary proportions, there could be an economic race over space resources, comparable to the emerging fight over the Arctic or over deep-sea fishing rights. The combination of space weaponization and space commercialization easily could thrust us into a new cold war (or worse). A hot war in outer space is unthinkable, and we cannot let it occur. Although the president is the commander in chief, he lacks the legal authority to create a Space Force on his own. Because Congress has the authority to make “rules and regulations,” and also has the “power of the purse,” President Trump needs Congress both to create and to fund any future Space Force. What Congress should demand as it considers the administration’s proposal is a comprehensive inter-agency space policy that takes into account all of the competing and complex interests in space. This is the process that Congress followed when passed the 1947 National Security Act, which created the Air Force. Congress also should reaffirm the U.S. commitment to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. Any other course could send us down the path of a major military confrontation in space.
71 +Arms control measures in outer space are rapidly becoming outdated, a specific focus on hybrid weaponry is necessary to safeguard US space interest
72 +Chow’18 (Brian G. Chow, independent policy analyst with over 25 years as a senior physical scientist specializing in space and national security, PhD in physics from Case Western Reserve University and an MBA with distinction and PhD in finance from the University of Michigan, “Space Arms Control: A Hybrid Approach,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, 12(2), pg. 107-132, accessed via: https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-12_Issue-2/Chow.pdf, Summer 2018) MMW
73 +Traditional Space Arms Control Ineffective In the emerging space proximity-operations era, space weapons will be technically synonymous with ADR and OOS. The difference is in the intent of whether such spacecraft are used for peaceful or ASAT purposes. Our space defense and deterrence cannot count on adversaries to always have peaceful intent. Also, in the emerging era, traditional space arms control will not be able to prevent weapons in space. Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty states that “State Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction.”18 While it is critical to ban weapons of mass destruction in space, subsequent treaties and transparency and confidence-building measures have done little to control or ban the placement of conventional weapons in space. Treaty proposals under consideration by the United Nations are mainly those proposed by Russia and China. Russia and China have been taking the lead to ban weapons in space. Their latest version of the draft Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space treaty (PPWT, hereafter the Prevention Treaty) was issued 12 June 2014.19 On 3 September 2014, the US analysis submitted to the Conference on Disarmament stated, “The draft PPWT (CD/1985) proposed by Russia and China, like the 2008 version, remains fundamentally flawed.” It concluded that “the United States has determined that the 2014 draft PPWT does not satisfy the President’s criteria in the 2010 US National Space Policy for considering space arms control concepts and proposals, namely, that they must be equitable, effectively verifiable, and enhance the national security of the United States and its allies.”20 This conclusion is based on three major reasons. First, the United States stated: “There is no integral verification regime to help monitor or verify the limitation on the placement of weapons in space. . . . Moreover, the United States has maintained that it is not possible with existing technologies or cooperative measures to effectively verify an agreement banning space-based weapons.”21 Russia and China responded that “PPWT is similar to the provision of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. . . . The Outer Space Treaty does not provide for any mechanism for verifying the fulfilment of this obligation and during the half a century that it has been in force no questions about verification have been raised.”22 Basically, the United States insists on verification, but Russia and China argue that, if no country including the United States complains about the lack of verification for the Outer Space Treaty, the United States should not demand a verification regime for the Prevention Treaty. Russia and China actually do not object to verification—if it is possible. As they stated: “However, we continue to believe that the development of a verification mechanism would be desirable for the subsequent full implementation of PPWT.”23 Second, the United States stated: “Typically, arms control treaties that prohibit the deployment of a class of weapon also prohibit the possession, testing, production, and stockpiling of such weapons to prevent a country from rapidly breaking out of such treaties. The PPWT contains no such prohibitions and thus a Party could develop a readily deployable space-based weapons break-out capability.”24 Russia and China responded that: The Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China maintain that the prohibition against the possession, testing, production and stockpiling of spacebased weapons does not contradict the purposes of PPWT. Furthermore, one of the principles that guided defining the scope of the treaty consisted in setting limitations that could be monitored. (Such monitoring capability is dealt with, for example, in document CD/1785 submitted by Canada in 2006.) Effective monitoring of ‘research, development, production, and terrestrial storage of space-based weapons’ — on which there is no prohibition, as is pointed out in the United States document — is not feasible in practical terms for objective reasons.25 Basically, Russia and China do not object to “prohibit the possession, testing, production and stockpiling of such weapons,” as the United States insists. Rather they are being practical “in setting limitations that could be monitored.” Thus, Russia and China should have no objection that the prohibition of tailgating another country’s satellites can be observed and thereby, monitored. Third, the United States claimed: “The Treaty does not address the most pressing, existing threat to outer space systems: terrestrially-based anti-satellite weapon systems. There is no prohibition on the research, development, testing, production, storage, or deployment of terrestriallybased anti-satellite weapons; thus, such capabilities could be used to substitute for, and perform the functions of, space-based weapons.”26 Russia and China responded that, While anti-satellite weapons as a class of weapons are not prohibited under the draft PPWT, the proliferation of such weapons is restricted through a comprehensive ban on the placement in outer space of weapons of any kind, including anti-satellite weapons. A ban on ground-based anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon systems has been introduced into PPWT through the ban on the use of force, regardless of its source, against space objects.27 Russia and China argue that ground-based ASATs are covered in the draft Prevention Treaty “through the ban on the use of force.” They clarify their argument by stating that “Furthermore, we would like to emphasize that in acceding to PPWT . . . the placement of weapons of any kind in outer space and the use or threat of force are prohibited.”28 Russia and China have made three additional important observations in their response to the US analysis of the Prevention Treaty: 1. There is a need for “reaching a common understanding of the right to self-defense under the Charter as regards outer space in the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS).” 2. “Furthermore, it is worth noting that the Charter was drafted before the space age had begun and, consequently, in our view, the unqualified and direct application of the provisions of the Charter to such a sensitive area of international relations as outer space development requires further elaboration and clarification through negotiation between States.” 3. There is “the need for clarification of the issue of the use of force in outer space on the grounds provided for under the Charter.”29
74 +CP means literally nothing- the aff is intrinsically cooperative
75 +Koplow ’18 (David A. Koplow, David Koplow is a professor and the co-director of the Center on National Security and the Law at the Law Center. He joined the Georgetown faculty in 1981, Georgetown University Law Center, Georgetown University Law Center, “The Fault Is Not in Our Stars: Avoiding an Arms Race in Outer Space”, https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3101&context=facpub, Volume 59, Number 2, Summer 2018)
76 +This Article emphatically does not advocate simple unilateral self-restraint by the United States. The three ideas assessed here are not based on passivity and a naive hope for enlightened reciprocity by others. Instead, the call is for aggressive diplomacy, seizing the occasion to exercise international leadership in attempting to forge a more satisfactory and complete space law regime. The United States cannot concoct global arms control on its own, but a strong American influence and sustained engagement are essential to build international consensus and generate concerted action.225 To emphasize, this is not “arms control for the sake of arms control,” nor are the three proposals designed simply to be more conducive to the misty goal of preserving space as a mythically special place. Instead, the objective is to pursue global stability and U.S. national security by retarding the incipient slide toward a space arms race that would be distinctly disadvantageous. Unless decisive action is undertaken soon, the retrograde erosion of the freedom and usability of space will likely accelerate, with the United States having the most to lose. The world has repeatedly alternated between arms racing and mutual restraint in ASAT testing and development; exploration of modalities for space control and negation seems to come in erratic waves, punctuated by moments of moderation. Now is the time to entrench the self-discipline, establishing effective, durable international discipline. To echo the title of this Article, the problem is not that arms control in outer space is inherently so much more complicated or difficult than arms control in other areas. Certainly, the challenges of capping the incipient race to establish counter-space capabilities will be profound, but other security realms have posed seemingly intransigent hurdles, too. No, the problem is human politics—both domestic and international—not the domain in which the controversies play out. Since the Outer Space Treaty in 1967, the world has witnessed major disarmament advances within the purview of nuclear arms (for example, START I under President Ronald Reagan, New START under President Barack Obama); chemical weapons (the Chemical Weapons Convention under Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton); and biological weapons (the Biological Weapons Convention under President Richard Nixon). None of those accomplishments was easy or automatic; at multiple points, it seemed that success was far from assured—but the negotiators pressed forward. Today, the resistance to effective arms control in outer space seems especially entrenched; even modest measures provoke a strong allergic reaction. Still, as Shakespeare’s Cassius advised Brutus, objective circumstances can make some tasks extremely difficult—but fate and “the stars” do not control our destiny.226 Instead, the fault is in ourselves; humans can overcome the frustrations and the challenges of governance—and we now have the occasion, the provocation, and the responsibility to try.
77 +Turn- US unilateralism ensures nation states double down militarize state- only rules of engagement solve
78 +Hitchens ’19 (Theresa Hitchens, Theresa Hitchens is a Senior Research Associate at CISSM, where she focuses on space security, cyber security, and governance issues surrounding disruptive technologies. Prior to joining CISSM, Hitchens was the director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in Geneva from 2009 through 2014. Among her activities and accomplishments at UNIDIR, Hitchens served as a consultant to the U.N. Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence Building Measures in Outer Space Activities, provided expert advice to the Conference on Disarmament regarding the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS), and launched UNIDIR's annual conference on cyber security, From 2001 to 2008, Hitchens worked at the Center for Defense Information, where she served as Director, and headed the center’s Space Security Project, setting the strategic direction of the center and conducting research on space policy and other international security issues. She was also previously Research Director of the Washington affiliate of the British American Security Information Council (BASIC), where she managed the organization’s program of research and advocacy in nuclear and conventional arms control, European security and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) affairs, Breaking Defense, “Experts Warn Space Force Rhetoric Risks Backfiring”, https://breakingdefense.com/2019/05/experts-warn-space-force-rhetoric-risks-backfiring/, May 28, 2019)
79 +The Trump Administration's Space Force proposal is "a canary in a very toxic space environment that is warning us about the challenges ~-~- military competition, a sense of vulnerability, increasing capabilities for counterspace operations ~-~- that we are just not dealing with very well," says Jessica West of Canada's Project Ploughshares “Always the predator, never the prey,” Air Force Chief Gen. David Goldfein’s catchphrase for US mil-space strategy, bristles allies WASHINGTON: The message for the US at the annual United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) space security conference could not have been any clearer: the domestic debate around national security space is backfiring outside of the US. The rhetoric in Washington from the Trump Administration’s proposal for a new Space Force is leading to fears about US intentions and sharpening tensions among major space powers. It is not having the effect of reassuring to allies and putting potential adversaries on notice of US resolve as a means of deterrence. “Language is important,” said André Dupuis, a retired Canadian Air Force lieutenant colonel who now heads Space Strategies Consulting Ltd. “I was at the Space Symposium a couple of weeks ago and there was a booth from Air Force Space Command with the tag on it: ‘Always the predator, never the prey’.” (A favorite space talking point of Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. David Goldfein.) “That sends the wrong message,” he said. “The challenge I have with the idea of Space Force and warfighting in space is that it’s blurring the concept of combat support mission — which for a long time has been accepted as a peaceful use of outer space — with a combart offensive mission mandate,” said Jessica West, a program officer with Canadian nongovernmental organization Project Ploughshares. “I don’t think that blurring is positive for space security, because it muddies the waters on intent muddies waters on intent and perception.” While an official from China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs didn’t mention the US by name — in observance of the unspoken rules of diplomatic discussion — she did raise a skeptical eyebrow about continued US insistence that its move to treat space as a warfighting domain rather than a combat support mission is being driven by Chinese and Russian threats. She noted: “It seems to me that now there is a kind of practice to conveniently explain the military buildup of some countries as the result of the perception of others’ threat, whether that threat is real or not.” Victoria Samson, Washington office director for Secure World Foundation that also funds the conference, pointed out that one problem with assessing intent to understand security threats is that unlike the United States, not many countries have actual space policies or formal space strategies. (Read China, but also India which threw itself into the great power military space competition with its March test of an anti-satellite weapon.) When there isn’t anything written down, she said, “all you can do is read a report about something happening and then speculate wildly.” That said, she also chided the US for sending a negative message about its intent by “consistently refusing to use the option of diplomatic outreach as a way to ensure access to space.That sends a message that diplomacy is not a valid tool or at least a useful tool.” Paul Meyer, retired former Canadian ambassador and now senior fellow at the Simons Foundation that also provides funding for the UNIDIR event, explained that in discussions of international security everyone understands that it is much harder to measure intent than capabilities. Policy statements and speeches by senior officials are some of the few tools available for assessing intent, he said, therefore “language really does matter.” He added: “So when you have a policy pronouncement that suggests that American dominance in space is the goal, that worries people. Similarly, a common sense reaction to hearing that space is being described as being a warfighting domain is that there is an intent to conduct a war in that domain.” West said that the question of the US Space Force is “a canary in a very toxic space environment that is warning us about the challenges — military competition, a sense of vulnerability, increasing capabilities for counterspace operations — that we are just not dealing with very well.” West, who also oversees the annual Space Security Index that annually reviews the state of space security, added that these perceptions about the challenges are shared by many states. “A lot of other countries are grappling with the challenge of how to protect and maintain access to their space capabilities,” she said. “At the same time there is a wariness and a reticence on the part of a lot of countries asking these same questions to go so far as to talk about warfighting missions in space which include a combat mandate.” Rajeswari Piali Rajagopalan, distinguished fellow at the Observer Researcher Foundation in Dehli, noted that the US is not the first space power to reorganize its political-military structures for national security space — China, Russia and even Japan have done so already. (China’s PLA Strategic Support Force for space and cyber operations. Russia Space Forces are underneath the Russian Aerospace Defense Force. Japan late last year set up a Defense Ministry center to counter space and cyber threats, and has the intention of standing up a ‘space domain mission unit’ by Japanese fiscal year 2022.) India, she added, is also considering how to set up a new “tri-service” space command in Bangalore (home of the Indian Space Agency), to be headed by an Air Force officer. She said this trend by militaries is an indication of the deteriorating space security environment and associated great power politics. “Given the worsening security scenario within the outer space domain, these were bound to happen in a sense.” That said, Rajagopalan cautioned that while these new military space organizations were currently focusing on integrating domestic forces to better deal with space security threats, they also could hasten the emergence of an arms race in space that would be negative for all space operators. “The competition among the major powers could deepen further.” This is why all of the speakers at the conference, including former Pentagon space policy cbief Doug Loverro, agreed that countries need to get more serious about setting rules of the road for activities in space — including regarding the conduct of space warfare. While there should be dialogue about preventing conflict in space, there is also a need for establishing rules of engagement — including some restrictions on certain types of combat operations. This is no different that in any other domain of warfare, where the law of armed conflict and treaties set boundaries for combatants, Loverro pointed out, adding that concerns about preventing conflict in space should not prevent discussion of the latter. On the other hand, Loverro argued that the Space Force’s creation could free Washington to be more willing to consider restrictions on military space activities. “Today in the US we don’t want to go ahead and negotiate anything, because we don’t know what our doctrine is for space combat, or space war or space conflict — whatever you call it. Lacking our doctrine, we don’t know what rules can agree to and what rules we can’t agree to, so we agree to none, which I think is very harmful.” One of the first duties of the Space Force, he said, should be creating that doctrine, which in turn would “then allow us to shape rules that are in everybody’s interest.”
80 +Ensures warfare
81 +Skibba ’17 (Ramin Skibba, an astrophysicist turned science writer and journalist, including The Atlantic, Washington Post, National Geographic, Newsweek, Slate, Nature, Wired, Undark, Scientific American, Science, Smithsonian, Aeon, New Scientist, Quanta, FiveThirtyEight, The Hill, San Jose Mercury News, and San Francisco Chronicle, I’m also on the board of the San Diego Science Writers Association (SANDSWA), and I’m the president in 2018-19, “Trump's 'America First' Policies Won't Work In Space”, Wired, https://www.wired.com/story/trumps-america-first-policies-wont-work-in-space/, August 23, 2017)
82 +SPACE IS A big place, but our upper atmosphere isn’t. Rapidly increasing numbers of satellites orbit there, in addition to innumerable bits of space debris, and rockets fly through it on missions to the moon, Mars, asteroids, and deep space. President Trump’s newly revived National Space Council will have to manage this busy region and beyond. The council members—which include heads of dozens of agencies, including the state, defense, commerce, transportation, and homeland security departments—have their work cut out for them as they develop recommendations for national space policy. Regulating and enabling commercial space activities will likely be a top priority, and the group will likely need to address issues including space debris and potentially militarized satellites. Given the risks of weaponizing space if the US, China, and Russia take their disputes beyond earth, and considering the commercial space industry’s uncertain position with respect to national and international law, the council’s first and primary goal should be to pursue space diplomacy. In a March op-ed published in The Hill, Scott Pace, director of the Space Policy Institute at George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs, wrote that “primacy in space is inseparable from primacy in the world.” Pace, who's expected be named the space council's executive director, emphasized the need to support national security and priorities—an “America First” policy in space. But space is international, and like Antarctica, it’s not owned by anyone, so Pace and his colleagues should proceed with caution. The United States alone has about 600 government, military, and commercial satellites in low-Earth orbit. The majority of them are GPS and communications satellites. If they were disrupted somehow, it would affect telephones, television, radio, navigation, and internet access. But China and Russia—which clearly have their own national interests—also have hundreds of satellites each. If the US were to militarize satellites, even in the name of deterrence, it could lead to a dangerous arms race in space. All three countries have anti-satellite missiles as well, and each is also developing other technologies including ground-based lasers. While a war in space seems unlikely, there’s no reason to escalate tensions and risk outright conflict. In 2007, China’s anti-satellite system deliberately blew a Chinese satellite into smithereens, adding thousands of pieces of shrapnel to the mix and worsening the space junk problem. NASA is tracking tens of thousands of space debris objects, but there are hundreds of millions more that are too small to be tracked, like so many space bullets that occasionally pummel orbiting spacecraft. A chain reaction of crashing satellites, like in the movie Gravity, could happen, especially as the debris adds up. Cleaning up space debris will require international collaboration and coordination, and private industry can help. Space agencies and commercial interests have proposed many ways to deploy spacecraft to collect derelict satellites and space junk or send them to graveyard orbits, possibly using harpoons, tethers, nets, or even a pulsed electron beam. However experts decide to resolve the problem, it will be costly and time-consuming. Companies like SpaceX, Blue Origin, Moon Express, Deep Space Industries, and Planetary Resources have designs far beyond merely launching spacecraft, delivering cargo and cleaning up space junk. They want to build bases on the moon and Mars and eventually extract resources from asteroids. If we don’t want space to become the Wild West, with international legal battles and disputes over valuable territory, it will be up to the government—along with other nations and international institutions—to take the lead. Just as the federal government scrambles to keep up with proliferating drones, it has limited time to do the same with the next frontier, the burgeoning commercial space industry. With the international nature of space exploration and of potential threats like killer asteroids, which need to be monitored and, if necessary, deflected, leaders from the US and other space-faring nations need to work together. Vice President Mike Pence, chair of the space council, has given few signs about what he, Pace, and their colleagues want to do, though Pence has emphasized the private space industry, human spaceflight, and national security. More leadership, as well as broad scientific, political, and regulatory expertise, will be needed to address all of these complex issues and make recommendations to the president. Setting the right priorities now will have implications long after the
83 +USMCA
84 +USMCA won’t pass – too many disagreements and Dems won’t give Trump a 2020 win – recent meetings.
85 +Tal Axelrod, 9-3-19, (Staff writer for the Hill, “Pelosi updates Trudeau on status of Trump's NAFTA revamp”, The Hill, https://thehill.com/policy/finance/trade/459827-pelosi-updates-trudeau-on-status-of-trumps-nafta-revamp)
86 +“Speaker Pelosi gave PM Trudeau an update on the progress of the USMCA Working Group’s discussions with the USTR during August, reiterating Democrats key concerns of labor standards, prescription drug prices, environmental protections and concrete enforcement mechanisms,” a Pelosi spokesperson said in a statement to The Hill. “The Speaker emphasized that Democrats are especially concerned with enforcement of the Agreement and Mexico continuing to implement labor standards and other key commitments,” the spokesperson added. “PM Trudeau and the Speaker agreed to stay in touch as progress continues.” Trudeau tweeted that he was “looking forward to our continued work on this” and that the deal would “support good, middle class jobs and create opportunities for people on both sides of the border.” The conversation comes less than a week before Congress reconvenes from its August recess, when the trade deal is expected to be hotly debated. Senate Minority Leader Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.) told reporters last month that there is no “deadline” for a vote on the USMCA but acknowledged that reaching an agreement could prove difficult as the 2020 election looms closer. “The closer we get to the next election, the harder it is. Speaker Pelosi and I are united ... and we believe that you need strong and enforceable labor protections in this bill, as well as environmental protections,” he said. “If that doesn't happen, there won't be a bill, plain and simple.”
87 +~-~--no passage~-~--Pelosi blocks
88 +Reuters, 9-3-19, (“UPDATE 2-U.S. Democrats concerned about USMCA enforcement, Pelosi tells Canada's Trudeau”, Reuters, https://www.yahoo.com/news/1-u-democrats-concerned-usmca-231746061.html)
89 +U.S. House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi told Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau on Tuesday that Democrats are especially concerned about enforcement of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) free trade agreement and Mexico's implementation of labor standards, a spokesman for Pelosi said. Pelosi spoke by telephone with Trudeau to give him an update on negotiations between Congress and the U.S. Trade Representative's Office (USTR), repeating Democrats' "key concerns of labor standards, prescription drug prices, environmental protections and concrete enforcement mechanisms," the spokesman said in a statement. "The Speaker emphasized that Democrats are especially concerned with enforcement of the Agreement and Mexico continuing to implement labor standards and other key commitments," the statement said. The trade agreement, which leaders from the United States, Mexico and Canada signed in November, must be ratified by lawmakers in all three countries. Mexican lawmakers have already done so. A statement from Trudeau's office said: "The Prime Minister and the Speaker discussed progress on the new North American Free Trade Agreement and welcomed ongoing work towards its ratification." The Trump administration is pressing lawmakers to quickly ratify the USMCA, which will replace the North American Free Trade Agreement, but Democrats who have the House majority say they will proceed only when their concerns have been addressed. The U.S. Senate is controlled by Republicans.
90 +
91 +
92 +(~-~--) Space Force fight with Pentagon now thumps
93 +Hitchens 6/14/ ‘19 (Theresa Hitchens, director of the Center for Defense Information and leads the center's Space Security Project. From 1998 to 2000, she served as editor of Defense News and was the director of research at the British-American Security Information Council, “Congress Gives Trump Rump Space Force”, https://breakingdefense.com/2019/06/congress-gives-trump-rump-space-force/, June 14, 2019)
94 +WASHINGTON: When is a Space Force not a Space Force? When it is a reorganization of the Air Force by a different name. The House and Senate Armed Services Committees’ versions of the fiscal year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) both ‘just say no’ to the Trump Administration’s plans for a sixth branch of the armed forces integrating all military programs and personnel dedicated to space. Instead, the HASC and SASC have taken action to separate the Air Force’s space activities into a Marine Corps-like structure, as well as rearrange the deck chairs on the Titanic that is DoD space acquisition. The two versions of the defense authorization bill vary on their approach to acquisition, but they agree on much of the structure of the new Space Force — or Space Corps. Proponents of the creation of a truly separate military organization for space — one separate from the Air Force and incorporating all four services’ space activities — remain cautiously optimistic that the moves by Congress are a step in the right direction. “Given the DoD’s poor job of presenting how we would move people and what criteria would be used, the congressional pushback is expected. And remember, when Congress created the Air Force (way back in 1947) they still left many aviation units in the Army, Navy, and Marines,” one former DoD official told me. “The only thing to discuss is exact roles and responsibilities for various elements of that force. … But in general, we’re on a decent path.” The HASC voted on the NDAA in a marathon session Wednesday through the early hours yesterday. The SASC passed its bill on May 22, but only released the text in full on Wednesday. Both bills foresee the new force as being led by a four-star general who will (eventually in the case of the SASC) sit on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (This is despite the SASC calling the new Space Force head a “commander” and HASC deeming him/her as “commandant”.) Both bills explicitly rule out folding the National Reconnaissance Organization (NRO) and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) into the future Space Force/Corps, and they forego amalgamation of Army and Navy space programs and personnel. The SASC explicitly limits the new force to Air Force personnel only; the HASC version does so implicitly, although the committee says it would be willing to relook the issue next year. SPONSORED Raytheon’s Counter UAS Technologies Gallery From RAYTHEON While the SASC gives the Pentagon and the Air Force one year to reorganize and stand up the new force, the HASC bill foresees a more gradual change-over happening between 2021 and 2023. While the Senate approved the Pentagon’s full $72.4 million request for the new service, the amendment to HASC Chairman Adam Smith’s markup asks the Pentagon to come back with a detailed report of estimated funding requirements by Feb. 1, 2020. The Space Corps provision in the HASC bill is based on an amendment by HASC strategic forces chairman Jim Cooper and it ranking minority member, Mike Rogers, passed separately in the wee hours Thursday. It essentially is a copy of their legislation from last year (when their roles were reversed). The amendment text (provided to reporters) does not including a funding level, and the final legislative text of the HASC’s NDAA is not yet available. Chairman of the HASC Strategic Forces Subcommittee Jim Cooper The SASC bill approves the Pentagon request of $72.4 million for the Space Force. It also provides more specific instructions to the Pentagon and Air Force about how to reorganize space acquisition authorities; whereas the HASC bill would create a separate system for all space acquisition (except that of the spy agencies) but asks DoD to come up with a plan for how to do so. The SASC bill would carve out space acquisition authority from Will Roper, head of Air Force acquisition. It would “expand and change the role of the principal assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force for space by renaming it the principal assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration (SAF/SP) and establish the position as the senior space acquisition executive (SSAE) for all space acquisition across the Air Force,” the bill says. The SAF/SP, acting as the SSAE, would report to the Air Force Secretary and would oversee and control all Air Force space acquisition activities, “including all major defense acquisition programs relating to warfighting in space.” All space acquisition projects currently managed by Roper would be transitioned to the SAF/SP, along with “control of the manpower, agencies, and budgets within the Space and Missile Systems Center, the Space Rapid Capabilities Office, and the Space Development Agency.” The SAF/SP would be equivalent to a civilian 4-star. Recommended Hill Likely to OK $8B F-16V Sale To Taiwan; DoD Mulls Where To Train The Trump administration is finding Taiwan to be a more than willing partner as it continues to look for ways to counter China By PAUL MCLEARY The SASC bill also would create a Space Acquisition Council “which would oversee, direct, and manage Air Force acquisitions for space in order to ensure integration across the national security space enterprise.” It would be chaired by the SAF/SP and include the undersecretary of the Air Force, the commander of US Space Command, the commander of the Space Force, and the NRO director. The latter is being included because the “committee believes that the inclusion of the Director of the NRO on the SAC would help to minimize the space acquisition seam that exists between the NRO and the Air Force.” It would meet at least once a month, and be required to report to Congress every year through 2025. The HASC bill, by contrast, asks the deputy secretary of defense to submit a plan that would allow the Air Force to “establish a separate, alternative acquisition system for defense space acquisitions, including with respect to procuring space vehicles, ground segments relating to such vehicles, and satellite terminals.” The bills reflect a bipartisan skepticism about the Trump Administration’s plan for the future of DoD space, while at the same time serving as a relatively mild rebuke to Air Force management of space programs and personnel. While the differing provisions will have to be hashed out in conference committee — and funding levels will now depend on the appropriations committees, with the House committee already limiting funds to $15 million for a Pentagon study — it is clear that a true Space Force is not in the cards anytime soon.
95 +(~-~--) USMCA won’t pass this year:
96 +Eric Sfiligoj, 8/5/2019 (Editor for both CropLife and CropLife IRON magazines, “How Will the New USMCA Trade Deal Affect Agriculture?” https://www.croplife.com /editorial/how-will-the-new-usmca-trade-deal-affect-agriculture/, Retrieved 8/11/2019, rwg)
97 +How Will the New USMCA Trade Deal Affect Agriculture? Eric Sfiligoj 2016 By Eric Sfiligoj|August 5, 2019 For many years, the countries of North America have conducted their trade using the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as their guide. Late last year, however, President Donald Trump nixed this deal in favor of a new one – the U.S., Mexico, Canada Agreement (USMCA). This agreement was initially signed by all three countries back on November 30, 2018. Now, according to V.M. (Jim) DeLisi, Chief of Fanwood Chemical Inc., it rests with the various legislative bodies in each country to finalize the terms of this deal. ADVERTISEMENT “Some people say that USMCA is NAFTA 2.0,” DeLisi said, speaking at the 14th annual AgriBusiness Global Trade Summit in Atlantic City, NJ, on July 30. “But it’s a lot more than that.” How will USMCA affect agriculture? It will be better than NAFTA It will be worse than NAFTA It will be the same as NAFTA I don't know yet Vote View Results For example, DeLisi said, USMCA features a change to subheading for the rules of origin, provided there is a regional value content of not less than 40% where the transaction method is used or 30% when the net cost method is used. Jim DeLisi Jim DeLisi, Fanwood Chemical “These rules should incentivize Mexico and Canada to produce active ingredients and intermediates for the U.S. market,” he said. “This could be especially important since India lost its Generalized System of Preferences status, which gave them duty free access to a significant portion of the U.S. tariff schedules. Further, since a chemical reaction is transformative under this agreement, it will allow such producers to purchase upgraded intermediates from China for conversion and then duty-free entry into the U.S.” At this point, however, politics might keep USMCA from becoming a reality right away. According to DeLisi, the Mexican Senate passed the legislation quickly and ratified the deal on June 19. The Canadian Parliament introduced the legislation on May 29 and is expected to ratify the deal by the middle of September. Then there’s the U.S. “The House of Representatives must act on this this deal first,” DeLisi said. “And once introduced, it must be voted on within 90 legislative days. But 90 legislative days is not three months in Washington, DC. It only counts days when Congress is in session – and Congress is on vacation for the entire month of August.” Given the “negative feelings” between many members of Congress, DeLisi wondered if passing USMCA would be possible before the end of 2019. And the consequences could be quite severe if no agreement is reached. “If you just withdraw from NAFTA from the U.S. codes without something to replace it, you would default back to the Canada-U.S. Trade Agreement, which is still in place,” he said. “This would keep trade between Canada and U.S. intact, but it would be an absolute nightmare for trade between the U.S. and Mexico.”
98 + (~-~--) FIAT solves the link- no debate
99 + (~-~--) Non unique and turn- Trump using PC on space now and the plan is popular- would bolster bipartisanship and Trump’s PC
100 +Bruno ’19 (Tory Bruno, Tory Bruno is the president and chief executive officer of United Launch Alliance, SpaceNews, “The new frontier of national security and exploration is in the heavens”, https://spacenews.com/the-new-frontier-of-national-security-and-exploration-is-in-the-heavens/, May 15, 2019)
101 +Fifty years after man’s first steps on the moon, the future of human exploration in the final frontier is at a critical turning point. American leadership in space is more important than ever and, importantly, it remains one of the few issues that transcends the partisan divide. The Trump administration and lawmakers in both parties have shown a commitment to human exploration in space and the policies needed to maintain America’s advantage. The Trump administration has prioritized an acceleration of America’s space exploration program, with the ambitious vision of returning astronauts to the moon’s South Pole by 2024 and establishing a sustainable human presence by 2028 using NASA’s new deep space exploration systems, the powerful Space Launch System (SLS) rocket and Orion crew vehicle. On Monday, the administration showed its commitment to these goals by requesting an extra $1.6 billion for NASA in next year’s budget. Since coming into office, the president has laid the groundwork for this visionary plan which can be seen through the revival of the National Space Council. Under the leadership of vice president Mike Pence, the National Space Council has centralized coordination of national space policy and new focus on defense and exploration priorities in space. With a renewed emphasis on space, the Trump administration is reasserting American leadership in an area that is not necessarily front of mind as a strategic concern. Fortunately, the administration’s efforts are bolstered by the fact that Congress has a history of acting in a bipartisan manner to protect and strengthen America’s interests in space. In the last Congress, the House and Senate unanimously approved the NASA Transition Authorization Act, which set forth new goals and initiatives for advancing deep space and scientific exploration, development of space technology, and expanding human presence to the surface of Mars and beyond. Moreover, Congress has encouraged competitiveness and innovation in commercial space launches over the years, including through bipartisan legislation to foster public-private investments for launch vehicles and associated launch services. Requirements by Congress to transition away from foreign rocket propulsion systems has served to strengthen the supply chain across the United States. United Launch Alliance’s Vulcan Centaur will ensure that we are developing more powerful and efficient launch systems to support both national security and help support NASA’s return to the moon by transferring cargo and other supplies to prepare for astronaut missions on SLS and Orion. Additionally, ULA has built the upper stage that will be used on the first two SLS missions and enable the first crewed return to lunar orbit since Apollo 17. As the vice president noted during the most recent meeting of the National Space Council, held earlier this year at the U.S. Space & Rocket Center in Huntsville, Americans have been building “the greatest and most powerful rockets” here in the U.S., and ULA is humbled to be a part of this proud history of engineering excellence. We look forward to working with the administration and lawmakers in both parties as we pursue the goal of launching America forward in the newest era of the space race. With the new Vulcan Centaur on the horizon, we will be taking an important step forward by ending our reliance on Russian engines. However, as China is already beginning to make clear with respect to its own goals and ambitions in the final frontier, it is more important than ever that we continue to act and embrace the urgency to innovate so that American values can help lead the way in shaping the future of mankind’s presence in space. At ULA, we are inspired by the call to “think bigger, fail smarter, and work harder than ever before.” We are encouraged by America’s renewed focus on space exploration. And we are proud to partner with the government and our private sector innovators as we harness America’s best and brightest to make sure we are putting our best foot forward, on Earth and in space. And now, we will do it once again from American soil.
102 +(~-~--) DA not intrinsic- reasonable policy maker can do both
103 +
104 + (~-~--) No link- we are the DOD and the plan wouldn’t cost money
105 +
106 +(~-~--) Turn- DOD shields and would spin as a win
107 +Bender and O’Brien ’19 (Bryan Bender and Connor O’Brien, Politico, “Leaner Space Force woos skeptics in Congress”, https://www.politico.com/story/2019/02/03/trump-space-force-pentagon-1132106, February 3, 2019)
108 +The latest Pentagon plan calls for a new military branch housed under the Air Force. The Pentagon is putting the final touches on its proposal for establishing a Space Force — and it’s not quite as ambitious as the vision President Donald Trump turned into one of his signature rallying cries. But the current version, considered a historic first step in elevating the military's space mission, is already getting a far more welcoming reception among Democratic and Republican skeptics on Capitol Hill. The latest plan calls for creating a sixth branch of the military, as Trump has proposed, by combining troops dedicated to space missions into a new armed service commanded by its own four-star general. But instead of the "separate but equal" Space Force that Trump advocated last year, it would fall under the purview of the Air Force, which would manage and host many of its operations and acquire most of its equipment. The Space Force would be loosely modeled on the Marine Corps, which is overseen and funded by the Department of the Navy even though it operates independently. But it would have somewhat less stature than the Army, Navy and Air Force, each of which has its own civilian secretary, control over its budgets and a network of bases and training facilities. It would even lack some of the independence of the Marine Corps, which maintains its own bases. The White House declined a request for an update on the deliberations. But several defense and administration officials said the White House has informally blessed the new proposal, which they describe as meeting the president's intent of a sixth military branch. And the approach is shaping up to be much more politically palatable on Capitol Hill than Trump’s original, more grandiose version. "I actually think this is a promising proposal," House Armed Services Chairman Adam Smith (D-Wash.) told POLITICO in an interview. “Not sure we're going to do it, but we can certainly work with it. … That’s probably a good template to work off of, and then the devil is in the details.”
109 +(~-~--) PC theory is assertions with zero support~-~--reject their ev
110 +
111 +1ar
112 +Specifically with Russia
113 +EIR ’19 (Executive Intelligence Review, “Russia and U.S. Still Enjoy Cooperation in Space Science, as Soyuz Launches Crew to ISS”, https://larouchepub.com/pr/2019/190314_space_cooperation.html, March 14, 2019)
114 +Despite the many disputes, cooperation between the United States and Russia in space continues. Roscosmos Director General Dmitry Rogozin and NASA’s Associate Administrator of the Human Exploration and Operations, William Gerstenmaier, discussed space cooperation between the two countries, Roscosmos press service told TASS today. “The conversation took place yesterday. They talked about the future of the International Space Station and further cooperation plans, pointing out that the NASA and Roscosmos groups continue to work and discuss cooperation and current pressing issues,” Roscosmos said. Roscosmos and NASA “hear and understand” each other as far as the future of the ISS goes, but no final decision has been made yet whether to extend the station’s operation as “everything is under consideration.” This evening, Rogozin and Gerstenmaier together watched the successful launch of the Soyuz-FG carrier rocket from Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan, which will deliver Russia’s Alexei Ovchinin and NASA’s Nick Hague and Christina Koch to the ISS tomorrow. Furthermore, Russian and U.S. scientists are in talks on the creation of a lunar navigation system similar to GLONASS and GPS, Vice President of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) Yury Balega told TASS. “In the framework of studying the Earth’s natural satellite, U.S. colleagues suggested developing a joint navigation system around the Moon, similar to GPS or GLONASS, so that all participants in Moon exploration projects can use it,” Balega said during a visit to NASA headquarters. The RAS delegation, led by its President Alexander Sergeyev, is currently in the United States on a working visit, where they visited NASA and also signed an agreement with the U.S. National Academy of Sciences on cooperation in the sphere of scientific, engineering, and medical research. Balega reported that the delegation discussed programs for exploring the Moon and Venus with NASA. “Our American partners said that they consider the Venus program to be predominantly Russian-led and think that Russia’s contribution to it should thus stand at 70-80%. We talked about different options of exploring Venus’s atmosphere, including launching a flying apparatus—a drone—into the high layers of Venus’s atmosphere, in order to study its chemical composition,” Balega said. He further said that “it is very important that we agreed to hold two brainstorming sessions on both Venus and the Moon in Moscow. The session on the Moon will take place in the Spring of 2020, and the one on Venus—in the Fall of this year.”
115 +
116 +Multiple space actions thump any generic links
117 +Bowe ’19 (Alexander Bowe, Policy Analyst, Security and Foreign Affairs, US-China Economic And Security Review Commission, “China’s Pursuit of Space Power Status and Implications for the United States”, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/USCC_China%27s%20Space%20Power%20Goals.pdf, April 11, 2019)
118 +Recent developments suggest the United States is committed to both significant new civil space exploration programs and a new Space Force in the Department of Defense; Heather Wilson, Secretary of the U.S. Air Force, said in March 2019 the United States “will continue to be the best in the world at space, and establishing a dedicated space force strengthens our ability to deter, compete, and win in space.” 141 In February 2018, the Trump Administration released its Presidential Memorandum on Reinvigorating America’s Human Space Exploration Program, calling for the United States to “lead the return of humans to the Moon for long-term exploration and utilization, followed by human missions to Mars and other destinations.”142 In March 2019, invoking a “space race” with China and Russia, Vice President Mike Pence, who leads the National Space Council, announced the Administration is committed to returning U.S. astronauts to the moon for the first time since 1972 by 2024 “by any means necessary.” 143 Major new projects such as the Space Launch System (SLS) rocket, the Orion capsule, and the Lunar Gateway—a small crewed space station planned for lunar orbit that will be able to support a maximum of four crew members for 30–90 day tours144—are funding priorities for the Administration, although NASA is open to commercial alternatives if the SLS is not ready in time. 145 According to NASA, the Gateway is “central to advancing and sustaining human space exploration goals” and will provide crewed missions a common jumpingoff point to space on the near side of the moon, for robotic and human lunar surface access, and for missions to Mars; it is designed to “offer astronauts longer stays on the lunar surface, easier crew returns, safe haven in the event of an emergency, and the ability to navigate to different orbits around the Moon.”146 Canada has announced a 24-year commitment to cooperate on the Gateway, and potential additional partners include Japan, Russia, and the European Space Agency. 147 If the Gateway is delayed and the ISS is not extended beyond 2024, however, retiring the ISS before alternatives for low-gravity research are deployed could result in a gap in U.S. space access, potentially grounding U.S. astronauts until NASA develops new space flight vehicles. 148
119 +
120 +Extend Jethwa – in the short term relations will continue to be in harmony – our evidence indicates that if relations are going to decline that that decline is inevitable due to Chinese Nationalist
121 +
122 +No link- not zero sum- China wants US-Russian cooperation- and turn- aff would cause China to increase Russian relationship
123 +Lu ’19 (Zhenhau Lu, SCMP, “China-Russia relations are unrivalled, Beijing warns before US’ Mike Pompeo meets Vladimir Putin”, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3010185/china-russia-relations-are-unrivalled-beijing-warns-us-mike, May 14, 2019)
124 +
125 +Foreign Minister Wang Yi says ties with Russia ‘not vulnerable to interference’ as he meets counterpart Sergei Lavrov and the Russian president US Secretary of State to discuss ‘full range of bilateral and multilateral challenges’ with Lavrov and Putin on Tuesday Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has issued a veiled warning to the United States not to undermine China’s relations with Russia and criticised “outside interference” in the relationship between the two countries. Visiting Sochi on Monday for meetings with counterpart Sergei Lavrov and Russian President Vladimir Putin – a day before the Russian pair met US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo – Wang said China-Russia relations set an example “beyond compare”, while the world was “in chaos and disorder”. “Unilateralism runs rampant, conflicting the current international system and basic norms of international relations,” Wang said, according to a statement released by the Chinese foreign ministry on Tuesday. “Rumours and smears are used as tools to attack other countries, as if a lie repeats a thousand times and becomes a fact,” he said. Wang’s comment came after Beijing and Washington dramatically escalated their tit-for-tat trade war, imposing extra punitive tariffs on each other’s exports after the two sides failed to agree a trade deal last week. Pompeo has warned of the dangers of Russian militarisation and Chinese investment in the Arctic, which he said had become “an arena of global power and competition”. He has also called on the US’ allies not to use Chinese telecoms company Huawei’s equipment to build their 5G networks. SUBSCRIBE TO US CHINA TRADE WAR Get updates direct to your inbox your email SUBMIT By registering, you agree to our T&C and Privacy Policy Lavrov and Putin were expected to meet Pompeo on Tuesday afternoon to “discuss the full range of bilateral and multilateral challenges”, the US State Department said. In a joint press conference with Lavrov, Wang told reporters that China, Russia and the US should get rid of unnecessary suspicion and misunderstanding and continuously expand cooperation with each other, according to Xinhua. Wang Yi said after meeting Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov that China-Russia relations were “beyond compare”. Photo: Xinhua Wang Yi said after meeting Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov that China-Russia relations were “beyond compare”. Photo: Xinhua Share: The China-Russia relationship, in particular, had set an example for the international community in this regard, Wang said. “We are ready to settle differences and strengthen cooperation with other countries including the United States on the basis of mutual respect, so as to strive for more peace, security and stability for the world,” he said. In Sochi, in a separate meeting with Putin, the foreign minister warned of “outside interference” into China-Russia ties. Wang said he hoped that the two governments “will continue to be able to reinforce mutual trust and mutual support”, according to a transcript released by the Kremlin. China and Russia should “prove to the world that our relations are not vulnerable to obstruction or outside interference and that we will always maintain the rapid pace at which our bilateral relations are progressing”, Wang said, without elaboration on the details of the “obstruction or outside interference” he was referring to. Putin expressed his support for China’s transcontinental infrastructure strategy the Belt and Road Initiative, and said his country’s relations with China “are being successfully developed in the most literal meaning of this word”. Late last month, Pompeo’s top policy planning official at the State Department, Kiron Skinner, told a think tank event that the US viewed China as a “different civilisation” and “a great power competitor that is not Caucasian”, according to a Washington Examiner report. By contrast, Skinner said that the US’ competition with the Soviet Union had been “a fight within the Western family”. Shi Yinhong, an international relations professor at Renmin University of China in Beijing, said the ongoing US-China trade war would deepen ties between China and Russia. “Any major US squeezes on China will strengthen Beijing’s motivation to move nearer to Moscow, whose relations with Washington have no hope of improving substantially now,” Shi said, “because of US domestic politics and international hotspots like Iran and Venezuela, and arms control treaties.”
126 +Their Kendall Taylor card says Xi and Putting cooperate because of mutual interests which means cooperation is inevitable
127 +
128 +No impact- relation fails
129 +Huang ’17 (Cary Huang, Cary Huang is a veteran China affairs columnist, having written on this topic since the early 1990s. He joined the Post in 2004, and was based in Beijing between 2005 and 2013, first as a correspondent and then as bureau chief. He was previously China editor at The Standard from 1992 until 2004, “Why China and Russia are unlikely to maintain a long-term strategic alliance”, https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/2113696/why-china-and-russia-are-unlikely-maintain-long-term, October 3, 2017)
130 +Why China and Russia are unlikely to maintain a long-term strategic alliance. Cary Huang says that mutual distrust of the United States can’t overcome the long history of rivalry between former empires, or meld diverging interests The high-profile joint military exercises between China and Russia have reinforced the fear that an anti-Western, China-Russia alliance is forming. Annual exercises between the world’s second- and third-best funded armies have included coastal drills in Vladivostok from September 18-21 and sea exercises in the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk from September 22-26 – following an earlier Baltic Sea naval exercise in July. The joint operation from Europe to Asia not only showcased a budding military partnership, but indicated determination to challenge US domination on the high seas. Recently, US relations with both China and Russia have become increasingly fraught. Moscow has faced off with the West over its aggression in Ukraine and intervention in Syria, while Beijing has been confronting the US in the maritime dispute in the South and East China seas. Thus, upgraded military ties between Beijing and Moscow are apparently designed to complicate US-led efforts to maintain dominance over sea lines of communication. But the development also highlights a truth in the theory of realpolitik, that both China and Russia need a powerful friend in their quest for global influence amid rivalry with the US. In this sense, they find each other to be the best strategic option in order to rival a much more powerful adversary. China, Russia, US and South Korea show off military power near Korean peninsula However, neither has shown much concern for issues related to the other’s core national interests – be it Ukraine, Syria and NATO’s eastern expansion, maritime disputes in South and East China seas, or Taiwan. Drills with Russia put Chinese navy to the test in unfamiliar waters Though sharing the world’s longest border, China and Russia share little in common in terms of history, culture, religion and tradition. Historically, they deviated substantially in self-recognition, as Russian tsars saw themselves as rulers of a superior European power, while Qing emperors claimed to be inheritors of the supreme East civilisation. Though there has not been an all-out war, the Arctic Bear and Oriental Dragon have not got along well at times, witnessing periodic hostility and conflict, from border clashes in the 1680s to modern-day conflicts in the 1960s and 1970s. Chinese President Xi Jinping shakes hands with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin during a signing ceremony in the Kremlin in Moscow on July 4. The two leader held formal talks against a backdrop of mounting tensions over North Korea. Photo: AFP Chinese President Xi Jinping shakes hands with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin during a signing ceremony in the Kremlin in Moscow on July 4. The two leader held formal talks against a backdrop of mounting tensions over North Korea. Photo: AFP Share: In their long interactions, the two nations have only experienced a very brief period of true alliance, enjoying a decade of friendship in the 1950s, largely built on the Soviet Communists’ critical military support of the Chinese Communist Party’s victory in the civil war. In modern times, their rivalry for influence in Eurasia has continued, with confrontations, in particular, in China’s border war with Vietnam in 1979 and the USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989. With a history of mutual suspicion, periodic hostility, the legitimating ideologies of historical grievances and victimhood, along with conflicting national interests, it is unlikely that the biggest powers in Eurasia can establish an outright and long-lasting strategic alliance, such as NATO.
131 +Can’t get North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons – here’s evidence – the arg was in the 2AC
132 +Michael D. Swaine, 9/11/2017 (Senior Fellow Asia Program @ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Time to Accept Reality and Mange a Nuclear-Armed North Korea,” https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Swaine_Time_to_Accept_Reality.pdf, Accessed 8/3/2018, rwg)
133 +Anyone following the growing crisis on the Korean Peninsula in recent weeks has been treated to an endless parade of op-eds on what to do about it, written from almost every conceivable angle. Despite the variation among these perspectives, most such proposals remain focused on how to get Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, this objective appears less and less viable with every new North Korean (DPRK) missile and nuclear test. This suggests the need for policymakers in the United States, China, South Korea, and Japan to adopt a more realistic approach focused on deterrence, containment, and an array of crisis management measures. While some nongovernmental observers are beginning to call for this approach, few if any present a clear explanation of either the reasons why such a refocus is needed, what specific key features it should include, or how to carry it out. This is a first step in that direction.
134 +BUT, even if, we’d crush them.
135 +James Harding 17, Captain in the U.S. Marine Corps – oorah – “If The Us And North Korea Engage In War, Will It End The Human Race?”, Quora, 2017, https://www.quora.com/If-the-US-and-North-Korea-engage-in-war-will-it-end-the-human-race
136 +If the US and North Korea engage in war, will it end the human race?
137 +James Harding, Captain at U.S. Marine Corps (2003-present)
138 +Absolutely not. Regardless of posturing, the Democratic Peoples' Republic of North Korea has no long-range nuclear weapons delivery system. They do have a submarine capable of firing ancient SLBMs, but those would be easy prey for the United States' ABM weapons systems. A nuclear reply would be unlikely, for political reasons. Following a ridiculously pointless launch by NK, the United States would launch a massive combined-arms assault the likes of which haven't been seen since Okinawa. With the US Army rolling across their southern border, the Marines landing on their beaches, and the United States Air Force bringing death from above, the war would last about a day. If the Chinese get involved, it would take a bit longer, but the US would kick ass. Who knows, maybe NATO and the rest of the world would take the opportunity to test their new weapons systems.
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1 +Klinger
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1 +UT Dallas BW
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1 +4
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1 +Samford Emerson-Gregory Aff
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1 +2ac1ar
Tournament
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
1 +gsu