Changes for page UMKC Mitchell-Willett Aff

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1 +==1AC—SST (Weber)==
2 +
3 +
4 +====Plan: The United States Federal Government should establish a national space policy substantially increasing its exchange and management of space surveillance and tracking information with the People's Republic of China.====
5 +
6 +
7 +===1AC—Deterrence===
8 +
9 +
10 +====SST Data is inevitably shared now but the plan ensures harmonization and stability—that resolves transparency, trust and debris to resolve miscalculation. ====
11 +**Fabian 19 **Christopher David Fabian, M.S. Space Studies, University of North Dakota, "A Neoclassical Realist's Analysis Of Sino-US Space Policy." Thesis for a Master of Science in Space Studies, University of North Dakota, January 2019 https://commons.und.edu/theses/2455/ PBM UMKC
12 +TCBM=Trust and Confidence Building Measure. SST=Space Surveillance and Tracking.
13 +AND
14 +SPD-3 is absolutely in line with the recommendations of this thesis.
15 +
16 +
17 +====Two internal links—====
18 +
19 +
20 +====Transparency—Internationally coordinated SSA is key to effective deterrence and defense — clarifies capability and intent to avoid miscalculation—attacks escalate to nuclear war and denial of space capabilities. ====
21 +**Rendleman 9 **Col James D. Rendleman, USAF, retired Space Law, Policy and Strategy Contributor, Colorado Springs, Colorado, Space Assurance for the 21st Century, High Frontier, Feb 2009, Vol 5 No. 2 https://www.afspc.af.mil/Portals/3/documents/HF/AFD-090224-115.pdf PBM UMKC
22 +Awareness The challenge to protect US space assets does not begin and end dealing with
23 +AND
24 +systems to continue to perform their missions for the short and long term.
25 +
26 +
27 +====Trust—TCBMs between US and China key to de-escalation—strong mutual incentive. ====
28 +**Wu 15**, Xiaodan, Lanzhou University, Space Policy Volume 33, Part 1, August 2015, Pages 20-28, "China and space security: How to bridge the gap between its stated and perceived intentions,", https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0265964615300023
29 +The inconsistency between China's states intentions related to space security and the perceptions of its
30 +AND
31 +and the United States cannot move towards interdependence and away from historic mistrust.
32 +
33 +
34 +**====Deterring space conflict is key – Chinese counterbalancing against the US creates incentives for first use and miscalc from debris absent effective cooperation====**
35 +**Billings 15**, Lee Billings, "War in Space May Be Closer Than Ever," Scientific American, 8-10-2015, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/war-in-space-may-be-closer-than-ever/ dw
36 +The world's most worrisome military flashpoint is arguably not in the Strait of Taiwan,
37 +AND
38 +the high-tension cloak-and-dagger military struggle in space.
39 +
40 +
41 +====China will launch ASATs and go nuclear — Chinese military perceives fog of war as advantageous, creating asymmetric escalation. ====
42 +**Zhao and Li 17 **Tong Zhao, fellow in The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace's Nuclear Policy Program based at the Carnegie–Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, and Li Bin, senior fellow working jointly in the Nuclear Policy Program and Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "THE UNDERAPPRECIATED RISKS OF ENTANGLEMENT: A CHINESE PERSPECTIVE" Entanglement: Russian and Chinese Perspectives on Non-Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Risks, James M. Action, Editor. Carnegie Endowment of International Peace. Nov 8 2017 PBM UMKC
43 +The phrase "fog of war" describes the ignorance or uncertainty of military leaders
44 +AND
45 +do not seem to have been explored or even considered by Chinese analysts.
46 +
47 +
48 +====Even without a launch, the divergence in understandings over ASATs locks in conflict. Only the plan's clarification solves.====
49 +**Zhao and Li 17 **Tong Zhao, fellow in The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace's Nuclear Policy Program based at the Carnegie–Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, and Li Bin, senior fellow working jointly in the Nuclear Policy Program and Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "THE UNDERAPPRECIATED RISKS OF ENTANGLEMENT: A CHINESE PERSPECTIVE" Entanglement: Russian and Chinese Perspectives on Non-Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Risks, James M. Action, Editor. Carnegie Endowment of International Peace. Nov 8 2017 PBM UMKC
50 +Ever since China's successful test of an ASAT weapon in 2007, its interest in
51 +AND
52 +-attack posture. China, they argue, should not feel inhibited.
53 +
54 +
55 +**====Independently, debris collapses precise missile targeting====**
56 +**Ahasan 18**, Towsif Ahasan, research assistant, GRI, "Space debris poses growing threat to satellite infrastructure," Global Resilience Institute (GRI), 1-12-2018, https://globalresilience.northeastern.edu/2018/01/space-debris-poses-growing-threat-to-satellite-infrastructure/ PBM UMKC
57 +Currently, millions of pieces of space debris are orbiting earth at an average speed
58 +AND
59 +industry is developing around tracking debris and selling that information to satellite operators.
60 +
61 +
62 +====Precision targeting is key to credible deterrence—stops multiple scenarios of nuclear escalation. ====
63 +**Lieber and Press 9 **Keir A. Lieber, Associate Professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Daryl G. Press, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College and Coordinator of the War and Peace Studies Program at the John Sloan Dickey Center for International Understanding, December 2009, Foreign Affairs, The Nukes We Need (recut PBM UMKC)
64 +Unfortunately, deterrence in the twenty-first century may be far more difficult for
65 +AND
66 +-yield weapons—as it cuts the size of its nuclear force.
67 +
68 +
69 +===1AC—Assurance===
70 +
71 +
72 +====US Indo-Pacific policy forces regional hedging and instability—shifting to cooperation resolves complexity and restores stability across Asia. ====
73 +**Saaman 19**, Jean-Loup Samaan, Ph.D. in political science from the University of Paris La Sorbonne, Associate Professor in strategic studies at the National Defense College in the United Arab Emirates, fmr. lecturer and deputy director of the Middle East Faculty at the NATO Defense College, fmr. policy advisor at the French Ministry of Defense, fmr. adjunct lecturer in strategic studies at the French Institute for Political Studies, Sciences Po, fmr. visiting scholar at Duke University, fmr. researcher at the RAND Corporation. "Confronting the Flaws in America's Indo-Pacific Strategy," War on the Rocks, Feb 11 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/02/confronting-the-flaws-in-americas-indo-pacific-strategy/ PBM UMKC
74 +This logic also leads the Trump administration to focus its efforts on strengthening America's partnership
75 +AND
76 +security architecture may also eventually force China to play according to those rules.
77 +
78 +
79 +====Declining space deterrent locks in hedging and Asian conflict escalation—only the aff solves. ====
80 +**Fabian 19 **Christopher David Fabian, M.S. Space Studies, University of North Dakota, "A Neoclassical Realist's Analysis Of Sino-US Space Policy." Thesis for a Master of Science in Space Studies, University of North Dakota, January 2019 https://commons.und.edu/theses/2455/ PBM UMKC
81 +TCBM=Trust and Confidence Building Measure.
82 +The confluence of current Sino-
83 +AND
84 +build trust and transparency can direct both nations towards a globally optimal outcome.
85 +
86 +
87 +====Scenario 1 is India—====
88 +
89 +
90 +====India's current ASAT posture causes a nuclear conflict with Pakistan – peacebuilding measures are key to cool raising tensions====
91 +**Minhas 6/16** Ahmed Saeed Minhas, Institute for Strategic Studies, Research and Analysis (ISSRA), National Defence University - Islamabad, 6-16-2019, "Indian ASAT Capability and its impact on South Asian Strategic Stability," Pakistanpolitico, http://pakistanpolitico.com/indian-asat-capability-and-its-impact-on-south-asian-strategic-stability/ Dr. Ahmed Saeed Minhas is a faculty member at DHA Suffa University, Karachi.
92 +The 27th of March 2019, will be remembered as an important day in the
93 +AND
94 +Vision-2047 while continuing diplomatic drive to achieve a peaceful outer space.
95 +
96 +
97 +====India closely models escalation — only US-China cooperation solves. ====
98 +**Rajagopalan 11**, R. (2011). India's Changing Policy on Space Militarization: The Impact of China's ASAT Test. India Review, 10(4), 354–378. https://doi-org.proxy.library.umkc.edu/10.1080/14736489.2011.624018
99 +While the Chinese ASAT test may have been a reaction to US military superiority,
100 +AND
101 +to supersede the best of the world, that is the US."58
102 +
103 +
104 +====Scenario 2 is East Asia—====
105 +
106 +
107 +====Hedging ensures Japanese space militarization—escalates security dilemma with China and North Korea. ====
108 +**Kallender and Hughes 18 **Paul Kallender & Christopher W. Hughes (2018): Hiding in Plain Sight? Japan's Militarization of Space and Challenges to the Yoshida Doctrine, Asian Security https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2018.1439017
109 +Japan's military space programs have only even really been hiding in plain sight given their
110 +AND
111 +. All this may reinforce the emergent security dilemmas in the region.93
112 +
113 +
114 +====Asian war escalates to nuclear war quickly — shifts in weapons posture is the key trigger====
115 +**Twomey 11 **Christopher Twomey, "Asia's Complex Strategic Environment: Nuclear Multipolarity and Other Dangers," Asia Policy, No. 11, 2011, MUSE
116 +Implications Each element of complexity raises its own problems, which are summarized in this
117 +AND
118 +for example, the United States and North Korea or China and India.
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1 +UMKC Mitchell-Willett Aff
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1 +1AC China SST Weber R5
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1 +Weber